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Abstract 
The ultimate purpose of macroprudential policy is to avoid financial instability, such as 
banking crises, which have a long-lasting and devastating effect on the economy. Although a 
growing number of studies have examined the effects of macroprudential policy on credit 
growth, few empirical studies have analyzed its effect on the probability of a banking crisis. 
Does macroprudential policy actually affect the probability of a banking crisis? Do other 
macroeconomic policies matter for the effectiveness of macroprudential policy? To answer 
these questions, this paper empirically investigates the effect of macroprudential policy on 
the probability of a banking crisis and its relationship with other macroeconomic policies. 
Specifically, using data on 65 countries from 2000 to 2016, we employ a probit model to 
analyze the effect of changes in the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on crisis probability. Our 
results show that macroprudential policy is effective in changing the probability of a banking 
crisis via a credit channel and that its effectiveness depends on other macroeconomic 
policies. Changes in the LTV ratio are found to be effective in influencing the probability of 
a banking crisis in countries that have inflation targeting frameworks, floating exchange rate 
regimes, and/or no capital controls. Our results underscore the importance of policy 
coordination among different government bodies to design an appropriate macroprudential 
policy, especially in the current context of the Covid-19 crisis. 
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Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis in 2008, macroprudential policy has attracted a considerable 
amount of attention from policymakers as one of the main macroeconomic policy tools for 
sustainable economic development. In the current context of a widespread Covid-19 crisis 
across countries, the macroprudential policy is globally attracting more attention again. The 
ultimate purpose of macroprudential policy is to avoid financial instability, such as banking 
crises. A growing number of studies have examined the effect of macroprudential policy on 
credit growth. For example, Cerutti et al. (2017) studied the effects of macroprudential policy 
on the growth in credit and housing prices, while Lombardi and Siklos (2016) constructed an 
index representing macroprudential policy to analyze its effect on credit growth. Beirne and 
Friedrich (2017) analyzed the impacts of macroprudential policy on cross-border bank flows. 
Richter et al. (2019) investigated the effects of the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on economic 
growth, whereas Basto et al. (2019) explored the effects of the LTV ratio on private lending, 
and Morgan et al. (2019) explored its effects on residential mortgage loans. Cronin and 
McQuinn (2016) found that a reduction in the LTV ratio leads to a greater demand for rental 
accommodation. Zhang and Zoli (2016) also found that the LTV ratio and housing tax curb 
the growth in housing prices and credit as well as bank leverage. 
 
In the current global turmoil of the economic crisis caused by the coronavirus, 
macroprudential policy can be one of the most important macroeconomic policy tools to 
avoid an economic crisis morphing into a financial crisis. During crisis time, there is a 
common concern that there could be large capital outflows from emerging markets and 
developing economies, which could lead to liquidity pressures in domestic or foreign 
currencies in the corporate and banking sectors. This can create maleficent feedback in 
particular where exchange rate depreciations are large and currency mismatches common. If 
the Covid-19 crisis is more protracted, the real estate sectors are also likely to be strongly 
affected, which could in turn potentially lead to amplification from falling asset prices. In this 
circumstance, deployment of macroprudential policy or capital flow measures (capital 
control) is now actively discussed among policymakers. 
 
In this paper, we have two policy-oriented research questions. The first policy question is 
about the relationship between macroprudential policy and the probability of a banking crisis. 
Does macroprudential policy affect the probability of a banking crisis? To the best of our 
knowledge, very few studies have analyzed the effects of macroprudential policy on the 
probability of a banking crisis. Part of the reason is that it is difficult to collect comparable 
data on macroprudential policy across countries.2 This is because macroprudential policies 
include different types of policies and because they differ across countries. Recent analyses 
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 Choi et al. (2018) analyzed the international spillover effects of macroprudential policy on crisis probability. 
However, their macroprudential variables are dummy variables for tightening, and for this reason, we cannot 
derive quantitative policy implications similar to what we study in this paper. 
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show that macroprudential policies have primarily targeted the housing sector, especially in 
advanced economies (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey 2018). 
 
This paper attempts to overcome this difficulty by using a novel macroprudential dataset 
recently published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Alam et al. 2019). This 
database contains levels of LTV ratios across countries, and its coverage is the broadest to 
date. Specifically, it covers 134 advanced and developing countries from 2000 to 2016. We 
use this new database to study the effects of macroprudential policy on the probability of a 
banking crisis. 
 
We use a probit model to estimate the effects of LTV policy on the probability of a banking 
crisis, controlling macroeconomic variables. Following the methodology by Nakatani 
(2018a), who studied the probability of a currency crisis, we also investigate the relationship 
between macroprudential policy and other types of macroeconomic policies such as 
monetary policy frameworks, exchange rate regimes, and capital controls. The empirical 
method of Nakatani (2018a) is also applicable to the banking crisis because it is based on the 
theoretical model of Nakatani (2016) that predicts the occurrence not only of currency crises 
but also of banking crises.  
 
The second policy-oriented research question is about the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy in relation to other macroeconomic policies, including monetary policy, exchange rate 
policy, and capital controls. How does macroprudential policy complement or counteract 
other macroeconomic policies to influence the probability of a banking crisis? For 
policymakers, this is worth researching because as we elaborated in the second paragraph of 
this introduction, there is feedback among macroprudential regulations, monetary policy, 
exchange rate regimes, and capital account restrictions. 
 
Recently, the complementarity between monetary policy and macroprudential policy has 
been studied frequently (Kim et al. 2018; Kim and Mehrotra 2019; and Agur 2019). It is 
known that macroprudential easing can usefully complement monetary policy by reducing 
the effects of the adverse shock on output and credit. Macroprudential relaxation can remove 
regulatory constraints which impede transmission of monetary policy accommodation, and 
enhance the ability of monetary policy to support economic activity. When the authorities 
need to tighten monetary policy to limit the inflationary effects of an exchange rate 
depreciation, macroprudential relaxation can help reduce potential stresses from monetary 
tightening. However, this relationship between macroprudential policy and macroeconomic 
policy has not been studied so far in the context of the probability of a banking crisis. In 
addition, what about the relationship of macroprudential policy with other policies such as 
capital controls and exchange rate regimes from the viewpoint of crisis probability? There is 
little research so far that has explored this topic. Thus, we study the roles of macroprudential 
policy for preventing the banking crisis in relation to the above-mentioned other related 
macroeconomic policies.  
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Our main findings are summarized as follows. In a nutshell, a tighter macroprudential policy 
is found to lower the probability of a banking crisis. Namely, we found that a tightening of 
the LTV ratio is statistically significantly associated with a lower probability of a banking 
crisis through a credit channel, as we envisage from the proper objectives of macroprudential 
policy. We also find that other macroeconomic policies do indeed matter for the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policy. Specifically, our findings show that changes in the LTV ratio are 
effective in influencing the probability of a banking crisis in countries that have inflation 
targeting regimes, floating exchange rate regimes, and no capital controls. For policymakers, 
these are new important empirical findings regarding the probability of a banking crisis that 
the extant literature has not obtained before. 
 
Our findings contain meaningful and practical policy implications. For example, our findings 
indicate that countries that have capital controls and/or fixed exchange regimes may not 
expect the significant impact of macroprudential policies on crisis prevention compared to 
countries without capital controls and/or with floating exchange rate regimes. The 
policymakers and regulatory authorities should be cautious about drawing lessons about 
macroprudential policy from other countries because the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy is very different if other countries have different monetary policy frameworks, 
exchange rate regimes, or capital account restrictions. Therefore, our main message is that 
policymakers need to take into account other macroeconomic policies when they design 
macroprudential policy for reducing the likelihood of banking crises. In other words, the 
policy coordination among different government agencies could be essential to conducting 
macroprudential policy effectively. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we review the relevant literature 
on banking crises and macroprudential policy. Next, we explain our empirical methodology 
and data to estimate the effects of macroprudential policy on banking crisis probability. 
Subsequently, we show our baseline estimation results based on the probit model and 
robustness checks using different binary choice models. Furthermore, we investigate the 
relationship between other types of macroeconomic policies and macroprudential policy from 
the banking crisis probability perspective. Other macroeconomic policies studied in this 
paper include the monetary policy frameworks, exchange rate regimes, and capital controls. 
Finally, we conclude our analysis with policy implications. 
 
Literature Review 
In this literature review section, we first survey the findings of related empirical papers about 
banking crises and macroprudential policy. Following this empirical literature, we review 
papers that analyze theoretical models of macroprudential policies later. 
 
Banking crises have been one of the major causes of economic disruptions and instability. 
Babecky et al. (2014) found that compared to other types of financial crises, banking crises 
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are the costliest in terms of the overall output loss. Nakatani (2019) estimated that banking 
crises reduce output by approximately 6-7 percent on average. Fernandez et al. (2016) found 
that banking stability is relevant for economic stability in terms of the volatility of value 
added in the economy. They also found that banking stability reduces economic volatility 
more in industries that have greater external financial dependence when they are located in 
countries with more developed financial and institutional systems. Teimouri and Dutta 
(2016) analyzed the dynamic adjustment of investment- and bank credit-to-GDP ratios after 
banking crises, and they found that deleveraging is costly to the economy. 
 
To avoid disruptive banking crises, macroprudential policies have been deployed in many 
countries. The empirical literature has studied the effectiveness of macroprudential policy on 
financial markets. Cihak et al. (2013) documented that crisis countries exhibited lower actual 
capital ratios, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to 
demand that banks adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had weaker 
incentives for private agents to monitor banks. 
 
Another area of research has focused on how to predict banking crises. Davis and Karim 
(2008) constructed an early warning system to predict banking crises. According to their 
findings, credit and real GDP growth are important for predicting banking crises. Spelta et al. 
(2019) used an early warning signal of the financial crisis identifying the systemically 
important banks. Buetel et al. (2019) used machine learning to predict banking crises. By 
contrast, Lee et al. (2020) built an aggregate vulnerability index to predict banking crises.  
 
Related areas of research have examined the intersections of macroprudential policy and 
other types of policies such as monetary policy and capital controls. For example, Korinek 
and Sandri (2016) found that both capital controls and macroprudential policy lead to 
financial stability by reducing net capital inflows as well as the amount and riskiness of 
financial liabilities. Bruno et al. (2017) found that macroprudential policy is more effective if 
it is complemented by monetary policy. Kim and Mehrotra (2018) found similar effects of 
monetary and macroprudential policies on credit growth, implying a complementary use of 
the two policies at normal times as well as a challenge for policymakers during times when 
buoyant credit growth coincides with low inflation. Thus, in our work, we also analyze the 
relationship between macroprudential policy and other types of policies, including capital 
controls, monetary policy, and exchange rate regimes. 
 
Recently, a growing amount of literature on macroprudential policy is developing theoretical 
models to study how macroprudential regulations can reduce the probability of a financial 
crisis. Ma (2020) found that macroprudential policy reduces the probability of crises and 
smooth consumption at the expense of welfare loss caused by marginally lower economic 
growth. Flemming et al. (2019) found that when the cumulative amount of borrowing is high 
enough in boom times, it is optimal to use tax debt to make agents internalize the systemic 
externality of their decisions. 
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Theoretical models to study the relationship between macroprudential policy and other 
macroeconomic policies are also becoming more numerous. Agur (2019) showed that leaning 
against wind-type monetary policy can backfire and lower the financial stability due to 
multiple equilibria, implying an importance of coordination ability of monetary and 
prudential authorities. Ghilardi and Peiris (2016) used a DSGE model and found that 
macroprudential policy can usefully complement monetary policy. Alpanda et al. (2019) 
found that LTV regulations are the most effective and least costly policy tool to deal with 
household imbalances, followed by bank capital regulations and monetary policy, 
respectively. Mendoza and Rojas (2019) showed that the optimal policy is to tax domestic 
credit or capital inflows, and therefore capital controls as a separate instrument are not 
justified. By contrast, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) found that the optimal 
macroprudential capital control policy should be tightened when the debt-to-output ratio 
becomes high after the fall in the interest rate, i.e. an accommodative monetary policy. 
 
Methodology and Data 
We mainly use a probit model to estimate the probability of a banking crisis. The regression 
equation to determine the relationship between macroprudential policy and the probability of 
a banking crisis is defined as follows: Pr(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖,𝑡) =  (𝑥𝑖,𝑡′𝛽) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, 
where Pr is probability; the subscript 𝑖 denotes the country, while 𝑡 denotes the year; 𝑦 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a banking crisis occurs and zero if not; 𝑥 is the 
set of independent variables; Φ is the normal cumulative distribution; 𝛽 is a vector of the 
maximum likelihood estimate; and 𝜀 is an error term. The dates of banking crises are 
determined by the method developed by Laeven and Valencia (2020). Following the 
identification method common in the empirical literature, we eliminate all crisis state periods 
except for the first period (start of the crisis). The macroprudential data are taken from Alam 
et al. (2019). We use the LTV ratio as our macroprudential policy variable because it is the 
only macroprudential policy variable that has quantitative information. We use changes in 
the LTV ratio rather than its level to capture the effects of macroprudential policy because 
the levels of the LTV ratio might be different across countries, reflecting institutional or 
financial market development. Theoretically, changes in the LTV ratio affect crisis 
probability by curbing credit to the economy, especially mortgage lending. Therefore, we 
multiply changes in the LTV ratio by the credit variable (credit-to-GDP ratio) to capture the 
precise transmission channel of macroprudential policy. Other explanatory variables are 
taken from the standard literature (Cerutti et al. 2017; Claessens et al. 2013). Our control 
variables include the GDP growth rate, income per capita (GDP per capita), inflation 
(consumer price index), current account as a percentage of GDP, and changes in monetary 
policy (real interest rate). 
 
All data are taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database and International 
Financial Statistics as well as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The data 
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sample in this study covers the 65 advanced and developing countries from 2000 to 2016 
listed in Table 1. The data frequency is annual. The detailed construction and sources of the 
data are presented in Table 2. The summary statistics for each variable used in this analysis 
are shown in Table 3. 
 
Baseline Results 
In this section, we discuss our baseline estimation results based on the probit model. Column 
(1) of Table 4 shows the results of the univariate probit model estimating the impact of LTV 
regulation on the probability of a banking crisis. The results show that the effect of the 
estimated coefficient of the LTV variable on the probability of a banking crisis is positive 
and statistically significant at the one percent level (the marginal effects are shown in the 
brackets in all tables). This means that a higher LTV ratio is associated with a higher banking 
crisis probability. This is an intuitive result because a higher LTV ratio is deemed to be a 
loosening of macroprudential policy, which could lead to financial instability. In this paper, 
this result is a new finding because few studies have analyzed the effect of macroprudential 
policy on crisis probability, as discussed in the introduction and literature review. 
 
Next, we show the results of our baseline estimation controlling macroeconomic and 
monetary policy variables that can affect the probability of a banking crisis. The estimated 
baseline results are presented in column (2) of Table 4, and the goodness of fit measures for 
our baseline probit model is shown in Figure 1. The figure shows that the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve is 0.887, indicating that the empirical 
specification of our baseline probit estimation provides excellent discrimination. Note that 
this area under the ROC curve (AUROC) is higher than those in the literature (e.g., 0.717 in 
the logit model by Schularick and Taylor (2012)). Put differently, our AUROC in Figure 1 
demonstrates that our probit model is very effective in predicting banking crises. 
 
We interpret our baseline results as follows. The estimated coefficient on the LTV regressor 
is similar to the previous result in column (1) of the univariate case. Specifically, the sign and 
statistical significance of the coefficient on the LTV variable in column (2) are the same as 
those in column (1), while its size is slightly larger. Our positive estimated coefficient on the 
LTV variable once again shows that a tightening of the LTV ratio is associated with a lower 
probability of a banking crisis through the credit channel. This main result is consistent with 
theory, and this is the first study to estimate this effect on banking crisis probability. 
 
For information purposes, the results of the control variables are summarized below. First, 
the coefficient on real GDP growth is negative and statistically significant at the one percent 
level. This means that higher economic growth is associated with a lower probability of a 
banking crisis. This is also consistent with economic theory because if the economy grows 
faster, borrowers can make higher earnings, and hence, it is easy for them to repay debt. In 
this situation, it is less likely that commercial banks will face defaults by borrowers, and 
therefore, higher economic growth will lead to a lower probability of a banking crisis. 
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Second, the coefficient on GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level. This variable is assumed to capture the degree of economic development. Thus, 
our results indicate that if the economy approaches a higher per capita GDP, it is less likely 
to face a banking crisis. 
 
The third control variable in column (2) is inflation. The estimated coefficient on inflation is 
statistically significant at the five percent level and negative. This is also consistent with 
economic theory because we expect existing borrowers to profit from an increase in inflation, 
as their relative nominal debt burdens decline. 
 
Moreover, although it is not statistically significant, the sign of our estimated coefficient on 
current account is consistent with the prediction of economic theory. A positive current 
account balance means that savings by domestic residents are higher than their borrowings 
from abroad. If the economy has enough savings, domestic borrowers will be less likely to 
default. The negative coefficient on the current account-to-GDP ratio in column (2) confirms 
this prediction but without statistical significance. 
 
Finally, our empirical results show that the monetary policy variable is not statistically 
significant but has the expected sign. The negative coefficient on the monetary policy 
variable indicates that monetary tightening is associated with a lower probability of a 
banking crisis. This result makes sense, as a loose monetary policy can lead to a credit 
bubble, which often results in banking crises. 
 
Robustness Checks 
As the next step, in robustness checks, we conduct analyses of our baseline results using 
alternative binary choice models. We use logit and tobit models for this purpose, and the 
results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, respectively. 
 
In sum, we find that the sign of each variable in the logit and tobit models is the same as that 
in the baseline probit model. The LTV variable is now statistically significant at the five 
percent level, showing that a loosening of the LTV ratio is associated with a higher 
probability of banking crises. We also find that the estimated coefficients on the LTV 
variables are larger in the logit and tobit models than in the baseline probit model, while their 
marginal effects, shown in brackets, are smaller than the those of the baseline results. The 
statistical significances of the other independent variables in Table 5 are the same as those of 
the baseline results in Table 4. Thus, it is fair for us to conclude that our baseline results are 
robust to different binary choice models. 
 
For the remainder of the analyses, we continue to use the probit model for two reasons. First, 
we are interested in analyzing the probability of a banking crisis, and to that end, the use of a 
9 
probit model is the most straightforward method. Second, according to our results, the 
AUROC is found to be higher for the probit model (0.887) than for the logit model (0.878). 
 
Monetary Policy Framework 
Next, we control and investigate the relationship between the monetary policy framework 
and macroprudential policy in Table 6. Since in some countries the central bank or monetary 
authority conducts both macroprudential policy and monetary policy together, it is necessary 
to include both policy variables in the estimation, which we already did in our baseline 
estimation, to avoid omitted variable bias. However, including the monetary policy variable 
as a control variable may not be enough to address all the effects from the monetary policy 
framework, as some countries are strongly committed to achieving price stability in the form 
of inflation targeting, which cannot be captured by the interest rate variable itself. 
 
In column (5) of Table 6, we included a dummy variable for inflation targeting countries, 
based on the classifications by the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions. Our results in column (5) show results that are quite similar to the 
baseline results presented in column (2) of Table 4. Specifically, the estimated coefficients 
have exactly the same statistical significance and are not particularly different in terms of 
their sizes, including the coefficient on the LTV variable, in which we are interested. Thus, 
the estimated effect of LTV policy on banking crisis probability does not change from the 
baseline results when we control inflation targeting framework with a dummy variable. We 
also find that the coefficient on the dummy variable for inflation targeting countries has a 
negative sign and is statistically significant at the one percent level, implying that inflation 
targeting countries tend to experience a lower probability of banking crises. 
 
In columns (6) and (7), we compare the results by splitting the sample countries into inflation 
targeting countries and noninflation targeting countries. We found two interesting results. 
First, we found that the monetary policy framework does indeed matter for the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policy. The columns show that the effect of macroprudential policy on 
the probability of banking crises is effective only in inflation targeting countries. This is one 
of the most interesting and important new findings of this paper. A possible interpretation of 
this result is as follows. Price bubbles, including housing price bubbles, tend to be relatively 
well controlled by the monetary policy in inflation targeting countries. In such a situation, 
macroprudential policy can become more effective in attaining banking stability by affecting 
credit volume. Second, the current account variable is statistically significant only for 
inflation targeting countries. This may be because in countries without inflation targeting 
regimes, external shocks can be adjusted by price fluctuations (presumably via adjustment in 
the exchange rate). 
 
Exchange Rate Regimes 
Furthermore, we study the effects of macroprudential policy on banking crisis probability in 
relation to exchange rate regimes. In doing so, we take three approaches. In the first 
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approach, we use an index that captures the flexibility of exchange rate regimes. In the 
second approach, we use a dummy variable for floating exchange rate regimes. In the third 
approach, we split our sample countries into groups of different exchange rate regimes when 
we implement regressions. 
 
Our results on the effects of exchange rate regimes are shown in columns (8)-(11) of Table 7. 
In this table, column (8) is the regression results based on the inclusion of the variable 
indicating exchange rate flexibility constructed by Ilzetzki et al. (2019). Column (9) shows 
the estimation results including the dummy variable for floating exchange rate regimes. We 
follow the method by Nakatani (2017a, 2018a) to construct this variable. Finally, in Table 7, 
the probit estimation results for the countries with pegged exchange rate regimes are 
presented in column (10), while those for floating exchange rate regimes are presented in 
column (11). 
 
The estimated coefficient on the variable representing exchange rate arrangement is negative 
and statistically significant at the one percent level in column (8). Recalling that a higher 
value of this variable means a more flexible exchange rate regime, our results indicate that 
countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes tend to experience a lower probability of 
banking crises. This might be a reflection of the role of the exchange rate as a shock 
absorber. For example, in the face of any financial or real shock, the exchange rate can adjust 
to absorb shocks to achieve stability in the market if the currency is floating (Nakatani 
2018b). The estimated coefficient on the LTV variable in column (8) is very similar to the 
baseline result in column (2) of Table 4, showing the robustness of our empirical results for 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. 
 
Supporting this finding, column (9) shows that the estimated coefficient on the dummy 
variable for floating exchange rate regimes is also negative and statistically significant at the 
one percent level. This outcome once again shows that countries with more flexible exchange 
rate regimes experience lower crisis probabilities. The coefficient on the LTV variable in 
column (9) of Table 7 is also highly statistically significant, and its magnitude and sign are 
almost the same as the results presented thus far, indicating the robustness of our main 
finding that a tighter macroprudential policy is effective in lowering the probability of a 
banking crisis. 
 
The abovementioned findings in columns (8) and (9) are supported by the estimation results 
based on subsamples (pegged/floating regimes) presented in columns (10) and (11) of the 
same table. Column (10) shows that the LTV ratio is no longer statistically significant for 
countries with pegged exchange rate regimes, while column (11) shows that it is positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level. These results confirm our finding that 
macroprudential policy is effective only for countries with more flexible exchange rate 
regimes. This finding is consistent with the results by Kim et al. (2019) who found that the 
negative effects of macroprudential policy shock on credit and GDP are more significant in 
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countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. It is also consistent with the latest empirical 
results by Poghosyan (2020) who found that the effects of lending restriction measures on 
house prices and credit are stronger in EU countries outside of the euro area, although he 
only studied European countries. We will discuss further policy implications in the 
conclusion section. 
 
Capital Controls 
Finally, we empirically delve into the relationship between the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policy and capital controls. Our analyses of the relationship between 
macroprudential policy and capital controls are shown in columns (12)-(14) of Table 8. 
Column (12) presents the results including a dummy variable for capital controls. We use the 
definition of capital controls by Glick et al. (2006) and Nakatani (2017a) to construct capital 
control dummies. Column (13) shows the regression results for countries with capital 
controls, while column (14) shows the regression results for countries without capital 
controls. 
 
Column (12) shows that the capital control dummy is highly statistically significant and has a 
negative sign, implying a lower banking crisis probability for countries with capital controls. 
The estimated coefficient on the LTV variable in this column is positive and statistically 
significant at the ten percent level with its size smaller than the baseline. As elaborated in the 
next paragraph, the results presented in columns (13) and (14) explain this outcome well. 
 
We make a very interesting comparison between countries with and without capital controls, 
presented in columns (13) and (14), respectively. The estimated coefficient on the LTV 
variable is positive for both groups, but it is statistically significant only for countries without 
capital controls. That is, there is a stark contrast in the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policy between countries with and without capital controls. Namely, macroprudential policy 
is effective in changing the probability of a banking crisis in countries without capital 
controls, while it is not so in countries with capital controls. This finding that 
macroprudential policy is effective only for countries without capital controls has never been 
obtained in the extant empirical literature, although this confirms the prediction of the 
theoretical model by Mendoza and Rojas (2019) who showed that the optimal policy is not to 
impose capital controls separately from taxing domestic credit. Our finding has very 
important implications for policymakers, as we discuss further in the next section. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We analyzed the effects of macroprudential policy on the probability of a banking crisis 
using an annual country panel dataset composed of 65 countries from 2000 to 2016. Among 
policymakers, there has been vigorous debate on this topic, particularly since the recent 
global financial crisis as well as the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. Although the major purpose of 
macroprudential policy is to avoid financial instability, such as banking crises, few studies 
have analyzed its effect on the probability of banking crises. This paper filled this gap by 
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utilizing a new macroprudential dataset that contains LTV ratios that are comparable across 
countries and that has the broadest coverage to date. Our main research questions are “Does 
macroprudential policy affect the probability of a banking crisis?” and “Do other 
macroeconomic policies matter for the effectiveness of macroprudential policy?” 
 
We showed four main findings that provide meaningful policy implications for central 
bankers and financial regulatory authorities. First, macroprudential policy is found to be 
effective in avoiding banking crises by curbing credit growth. In other words, we found that a 
tightening of the LTV ratio is statistically significantly associated with a lower probability of 
banking crises, and vice versa, through a credit channel. This finding is consistent with the 
objectives of macroprudential policy, as it aims to attenuate credit booms and to avoid the 
instability of banking systems. Second, we found that the monetary policy framework matters 
for the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. Specifically, our results indicate that 
macroprudential policy is effective only in inflation targeting countries. Our interpretation is 
that price bubbles, including housing price bubbles, tend to be relatively well controlled by 
monetary policy in inflation targeting countries. In such a situation, macroprudential policy 
can become more effective in attaining banking stability by affecting credit volume. Third, 
exchange rate regimes also matter for the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. More 
specifically, macroprudential policy is more effective in countries with more flexible 
exchange rate regimes. This might reflect the fact that the floating exchange rate regimes are 
more vulnerable to shocks that trigger financial crises, as found by Nakatani (2018a), and 
there is more room for macroprudential policy to deal with these shocks (e.g. risk premium 
shock). Fourth, macroprudential policy is effective in avoiding banking crises in countries 
without capital controls but not in countries with capital controls. This is in line with the 
theoretical model by Mendoza and Rojas (2019). All four of these findings are new and very 
important for policymakers, including monetary and financial regulatory authorities. 
 
What are the policy implications that can be drawn from this research? Our analyses indicate 
that the effectiveness of macroprudential policy depends on other macroeconomic policies. 
We found that macroprudential policy is more effective in countries with an inflation 
targeting framework or floating exchange rate regimes or in countries without capital 
controls. Thus, policymakers need to consider the combination of multiple different 
macroeconomic policies when formulating macroprudential policies. This implies that 
conversation and communication between different authorities are crucial for designing 
macroprudential policy. This is because financial regulatory authorities (or central banks) are 
usually in charge of macroprudential policy, while the monetary policy framework is the 
responsibility of monetary authorities, exchange rate policies can be covered by the ministry 
of finance, and capital controls are managed by the ministry of economy, for example. In 
such a situation, policy dialogues should be carried out across different government bodies 
for policy coordination to achieve financial stability. They need to discuss what the primary 
objective of macroprudential policy is and how other types of macroeconomic policies can 
interact with it. 
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This message is particularly important in the context of the ongoing policymakers’ efforts to 
combat the Covid-19 crisis for good and clear public policy communication. To agree on 
policies in the thick of the crisis, the government can set up a task force of senior officials 
gathered in a crisis management committee, which includes all governmental agencies in 
charge of managing the financial crisis (i.e., the monetary authority, ministry of finance, 
supervisory agencies, ministry of economy, etc.). They should have primary responsibility 
for agreeing the coordinated policy lines and communication strategy. Although it is out of 
scope for this paper, fiscal policy can also play a role in supporting firms, banks and 
households in providing liquidity through various packages and reducing the likelihood of 
their defaults in the short term. A combination of macroprudential policy with fiscal policy 
would carry more responsibility especially if the interest rate is close to zero and there is 
limited scope for the use of monetary policy (Gustafsson et al. 2016). 
 
One of the main policy messages of our analysis is that policymakers and financial regulatory 
authorities should be very cautious about learning lessons from other countries’ experiences. 
This is because the effectiveness of macroprudential policy differs significantly across 
countries that have different monetary policy frameworks, exchange rate policies, and capital 
flow measures. In particular, our findings indicate that the LTV policy is not effective in 
changing the probability of a banking crisis in countries that have no inflation targeting 
framework, pegged exchange rate regimes, and/or capital controls. In these countries, 
policymakers need to find other types of macroprudential or macroeconomic policies that can 
effectively prevent a banking crisis. 
 
Our empirical results also contain practically meaningful implications for policymaking in 
the area of the housing sector. For example, the relationship between capital controls and 
macroprudential policy could be very important, especially in real estate sectors, where 
foreign investors can play a major role in creating housing booms, which in turn can lead to a 
banking crisis. In recent years, some countries that have experienced housing booms due to 
foreign buyers have introduced a ban on the purchase of residential property by foreign 
residents. In this case, such countries used capital controls as a policy tool to stabilize their 
housing markets. The results of our research indicate that for countries without capital 
controls, a certain macroprudential policy such as LTV regulations may be effective in 
attaining banking stability by containing credit growth. 
 
Based on the new findings in this article, let us conclude our paper by proposing a future 
research topic. Although a growing number of papers are now studying the interactions of 
macroprudential policy with monetary policy and capital controls, the theoretical literature 
analyzing the direct link between macroprudential policy and exchange rate policy is scant 
(Lubis et al. 2019). Future research should further investigate the complementary relationship 
between macroprudential policy and exchange rate policy. For example, exchange rate 
flexibility can influence the economic bubble through domestic asset and import price 
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inflation as well as balance sheets of firms, households, and commercial banks. Recently, 
Nakatani (2017b) proved that an optimal monetary policy response to prevent currency crises 
depends on structural vulnerability characterized by the relative size of foreign currency 
denominated debt and exports because depreciation of exchange rates could either boost or 
hinder economic growth. In this sense, the optimal exchange rate policy may differ across 
economies depending on their economic structure, and complementary roles of 
macroprudential policy could also differ. The types of macroprudential policy (e.g. borrower-
based; capital-based; liquidity-based) could also matter in this regard. The proposed potential 
future research question is “what is the mechanism by which macroprudential policy interacts 
with exchange rate flexibility?” To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical model 
that has been used to investigate this topic to date. 
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 Table 1: Sample of Countries 
 
  
Argentina Denmark Italy New Zealand Slovenia
Australia Estonia Japan Nigeria South Africa
Austria Finland Korea Norway Spain
Belgium France Kuwait Peru Sweden
Brazil Germany Latvia Philippines Switzerland
Bulgaria Greece Lebanon Poland Taiwan
Canada Hong Kong Lithuania Portugal Thailand
Chile Hungary Luxembourg Romania Turkey
China Iceland Malaysia Russia Ukraine
Colombia India Malta Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
Croatia Indonesia Mexico Serbia United Kingdom
Cyprus Ireland Mongolia Singapore United States
Czech Republic Israel Netherlands Slovak Republic Uruguay
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Table 2: Data Description 
 
  
Variable Definition Source
Banking crisis Crisis=1; No crisis=0 Laeven and Valencia (2018)
LTV Yearly average LTV Alam et al. (2019)
GDP growth Real GDP growth rate (%) IMF's World Economic Outlook
Income per capita GDP per capita, current price in thousand U.S. dollars IMF's World Economic Outlook
Inflation Yearly average consumer price inflation rate (%) IMF's World Economic Outlook
Current account Current account balance as a percentage of GDP IMF's World Economic Outlook
Credit Domestic credit provided by financial sector divided by GDP World Bank's World Development Indicators
Monetary policy Real interest rate (%) World Bank's World Development Indicators
Inflation targeting Inflation targeting=1; No inflation targeting=0 IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
Exchange rate arrangement Index Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff  (2017)
Float Float=1; Peg=0 IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
Capital control Control=1; No control=0 IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
 Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Figure 1: Area under the ROC Curve 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Banking crisis 0.026 0.160 0.000 1.000
LTV 92.479 13.868 35.000 110.000
GDP growth 3.274 3.724 -15.136 25.007
Income per capita 23.450 20.949 0.463 120.857
Inflation 4.012 5.853 -3.749 80.744
Current account 0.683 8.301 -27.386 45.462
Credit 1.087 0.675 0.230 3.475
Monetary policy 5.343 8.375 -26.629 93.915
Inflation targeting 0.494 0.500 0.000 1.000
Exchange rate arrangement 6.676 4.558 1.000 14.000
Float 0.565 0.496 0.000 1.000
Capital control 0.489 0.500 0.000 1.000
0.
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0.
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0.
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0.
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1.
00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.8870
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Table 4: Baseline Results 
 
  
(1) (2)
Estimation Method Probit Probit
△LTV*Credit 0.0445*** 0.0552***
(0.0105) (0.0203)
[0.0177] [0.0040]
GDP growth -0.1817***
(0.0220)
[-0.0133]
Income per capita -0.0389***
(0.0045)
[-0.0029]
Inflation -0.0928***
(0.0160)
[-0.0068]
Current account -0.0108
(0.0129)
[-0.0008]
△Monetary policy -0.0233
(0.0155)
[-0.0017]
Sample All All
Number of observations 976 661
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in brackets.
　*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
　  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
　    * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 
  
(3) (4)
Estimation Method Logit Tobit
△LTV*Credit 0.1110** 0.1393**
(0.0442) (0.0620)
[0.0000] [0.0000]
GDP growth -0.3302*** -0.4520***
(0.0467) (0.1265)
[-0.0001] [-0.0000]
Income per capita -0.00852*** -0.0000***
(0.0128) (0.0000)
[-0.0000] [-0.0000]
Inflation -0.2258*** -0.2356***
(0.0430) (0.0753)
[-0.0000] [-0.0000]
Current account -0.0125 -0.0264
(0.0268) (0.0329)
[-0.0000] [-0.0000]
△Monetary policy -0.0498 -0.0603
(0.0327) (0.0415)
[-0.0000] [-0.0000]
Sample All All
Number of observations 661 661
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in brackets.
　*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
　  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
　    * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6: Relationship with the Monetary Policy Framework 
 
  
(5) (6) (7)
Estimation Method Probit Probit Probit
△LTV*Credit 0.0590*** 0.0442*** 0.0428
(0.0204) (0.0212) (0.0733)
[0.0035] [0.0008] [0.0038]
GDP growth -0.1613*** -0.2024*** -0.1550***
(0.0225) (0.0401) (0.0258)
[-0.0096] [-0.0036] [-0.0136]
Income per capita -0.0269*** -0.0203*** -0.0046***
(0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0068)
[-0.0016] [-0.0004] [-0.0040]
Inflation -0.0687*** -0.3060*** -0.0621***
(0.0154) (0.0563) (0.0157)
[-0.0041] [-0.0055] [-0.0055]
Current account -0.0181 -0.0949*** -0.0043
(0.0120) (0.0360) (0.0141)
[-0.0011] [-0.0017] [-0.0004]
△Monetary policy -0.0199 0.0022 -0.0196
(0.0148) (0.0444) (0.0163)
[-0.0012] [0.0000] [-0.0017]
Inflation targeting -0.9950***
(0.1865)
[-0.0594]
Sample All
Inflation
Targeting
No Inflation
Targeting
Number of observations 661 341 320
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in brackets.
　*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
　  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
　    * Significant at the 10 percent level.
24 
Table 7: Relationship with Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Estimation Method Probit Probit Probit Probit
△LTV*Credit 0.0571*** 0.0626*** 0.0737 0.0473***
(0.0205) (0.0203) (0.1411) (0.0215)
[0.0021] [0.0032] [0.0080] [0.0027]
GDP growth -0.1226*** -0.1293*** -0.1487*** -0.1884***
(0.0247) (0.0236) (0.0364) (0.0289)
[-0.0046] [-0.0066] [-0.0162] [-0.0109]
Income per capita -0.0196*** -0.0280*** -0.0430*** -0.0381***
(0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0071) (0.0058)
[-0.0007] [-0.0014] [-0.0047] [-0.0022]
Inflation -0.0063 -0.0277 -0.0476 -0.1179***
(0.0146) (0.0169) (0.0297) (0.0222)
[-0.0002] [-0.0014] [-0.0052] [-0.0068]
Current account -0.0094 -0.0071 0.0108 -0.0456**
(0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0152) (0.0228)
[-0.0004] [-0.0004] [0.0012] [-0.0026]
△Monetary policy -0.0129 -0.0142 -0.0160 -0.0238
(0.0165) (0.0155) (0.0210) (0.0225)
[-0.0005] [-0.0007] [-0.0017] [-0.0014]
Exchange rate arrangement -0.1616***
(0.0218)
[-0.0061]
Float -1.2085***
(0.1875)
[-0.0614]
Sample All All Peg Float
Number of observations 661 661 188 473
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in brackets.
　*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
　  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
　    * Significant at the 10 percent level.
25 
Table 8: Relationship with Capital Controls 
 
(12) (13) (14)
Estimation Method Probit Probit Probit
△LTV*Credit 0.0039* 0.0268 0.0718***
(0.0213) (0.0365) (0.0228)
[0.0024] [0.0027] [0.0040]
GDP growth -0.1591*** -0.1974*** -0.1655***
(0.0240) (0.0268) (0.0432)
[-0.0099] [-0.0198] [-0.0093]
Income per capita -0.0340*** -0.0266*** -0.0487***
(0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0074)
[-0.0021] [-0.0027] [-0.0027]
Inflation -0.0496*** -0.0997*** -0.0908**
(0.0172) (0.0179) (0.0394)
[-0.0031] [-0.0100] [-0.0051]
Current account -0.0221 0.0032 -0.0197
(0.0142) (0.0172) (0.0241)
[-0.0014] [0.0003] [-0.0011]
△Monetary policy -0.0168 -0.0581** 0.0053
(0.0162) (0.0236) (0.0237)
[-0.0010] [-0.0058] [0.0003]
Capital control -0.8997***
(0.1846)
[-0.0559]
Sample All Capital Control
No Capital
Control
Number of observations 656 334 322
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects in brackets.
　*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
　  ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
　    * Significant at the 10 percent level.
